



Instrumental and relational determinants of trust in management among members of works councils

Determinants of trust in management

623

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Abstract *In Western Europe, works councils are a common form of indirect employee participation in management decision making. Trust is often assumed to play an important role in the nature and outcomes of labour negotiations and in management-works council consultations. So far, however, the antecedents of trust in management within works councils have not been studied. Using longitudinal data collected among the members of 75 Dutch works councils, the current study tests predictions regarding the relative influence of instrumental vs relational antecedents on the level of trust in management among works council members. An important role of instrumental predictors (e.g. perceived influence of the works council on management decision making) supports a view of trust as a calculative phenomenon. On the other hand, strong effects of relational predictors would lend support to trust as a relational phenomenon. The data show that trust in management among works council members is related to relational rather than instrumental antecedents.*

Introduction

Works councils are a widespread phenomenon throughout Western Europe. Works councils consist of employees that in most cases have been elected to represent the interests of the work force in management decision making, and to improve communication between management and the work force. Rogers and Streeck (1995, p. 6) define works councils as:

[...] institutionalised bodies for representative communication between a single employer ("management") and the employees ("workforce") of a single plant or enterprise.

In most European countries, the rights of works councils are statutory. For example, in The Netherlands, works councils have, depending on the issue at hand, the rights of information, consultation and co-determination.

Despite the fact that these rights are the same for every Dutch works council, large differences exist in the (perceived or factual) influence of works councils and in the way this influence is brought about (Visser, 1995). Whereas some works councils fully co-operate and share information in their negotiations with management, others deal with management in a much more confrontational style. In the literature on negotiating these differences in bargaining styles have been strongly associated with different levels of trust. Works councils and management typically deal with issues that have a high



integrative (as opposed to distributive (Walton and McKersie, 1965)) potential: the gains of one party do not inevitably lead to a loss of the other party. Walton and McKersie (1965, p. 358) state that in integrative bargaining situations, trust enables parties to increase their joint gain. The authors call trust an “unmixed asset in negotiations”. Indeed, Butler (1995) shows that increasing levels of trust in negotiations lead to more information sharing and pursuit of the opponents’ interest. Based on a review of the literature about trust and negotiating, Ross and LaCroix (1996) conclude that trust is associated with a better relationship with the other party and with more risk taking behaviour (e.g. information sharing, making concessions). Beersma and De Dreu (1999) show that trust is associated with more problem-solving behaviour and higher joint outcomes. Thus, in a bargaining situation trust appears to be vital.

Practice learns that trust is by no means characteristic of the attitude of works council members towards management and vice versa. In The Netherlands, works council members have over time become more positive about their consultations with management and less radical in their means of gaining influence (Teulings, 1989). This is not to say that works council members are management’s best friends these days; many works councils still find themselves in conflict with management on a regular basis. Again, large differences exist in the amount of conflict and trust between management and works councils (van het Kaar and Looise, 1999).

Alternatively, the attitude of employers towards works councils has always been ambivalent (Rogers and Streeck, 1996, p. 16). On the one hand, works councils provide employers with a non-union alternative in workplace industrial relations that, in theory, gives management the freedom of movement they want in order to be competitive. On the other hand, many employers fear that works councils become union instruments that will affect their freedom to act and their speed of acting. For example, Visser (1995) cites a Philips director of industrial relations complaining that works council members lack expertise, indulge in unnecessary procedures, attract unwelcome press attention and waste time and energy.

Given the importance of trust in bargaining situations, and given the large differences in the level of trust, it is surprising to see that no research exists regarding the determinants of trust in management among works council members. Research on works councils typically focuses on the laws underlying their existence, on the influence they have on decision making and on their effect on organisational effectiveness (e.g. innovativeness and profitability), but hardly on questions regarding trust. In this paper we will use data of a longitudinal study among works council members to determine the antecedents of their trust (or distrust) in management. We will focus on two kinds of determinants: determinants that stem from rational choice theory and that focus on self interest (instrumental determinants), and determinants that stem from relational models of trust and that focus on the social basis of trust

(relational determinants, e.g. Kramer and Tyler (1996)). In this study, instrumental determinants will include the perceived influence and effectiveness of the works council. Relational determinants include perceived fairness of decision-making procedures and the quality of treatment by management.

In the remainder of this introduction we will portray the relationship between a works council and management, we will look at the literature regarding the determinants of trust in the situation that works council members are in, and then focus on instrumental vs relational determinants of trust.

The relationship between management and works council members and its consequences for trust

The relationship between management and works council members is non-hierarchical; although works council members bargain with the person who is typically the chief executive officer (CEO) of the organisation, and therefore their boss. This hierarchical situation ends as soon as they meet the CEO as a member of the works council instead of as an employee. However, this is not to say that theories of trust in management cannot be used in this situation. First, although in formal terms the hierarchical difference vanishes when an employee acts as a member of the works council, the difference may still exist in the eyes of both the manager and the works council member. It is unlikely that both parties show the flexibility to think, feel and behave in totally different ways when they meet in different situations. Second, even when formally there is no hierarchical difference, there is a strong difference in power between management and the works council. French and Raven (1959) distinguish different psychological bases of power, among which the informational (or expert) basis of power: power based on informational asymmetry between parties. When one party has access to information that the other party needs, the one party will be more powerful. In The Netherlands, works councils are supported by a law that describes in great detail when works councils have the right to be informed, consulted or to co-determine. However, in practice, works councils are still very dependent on management. The literature on works councils shows that the power of works councils based on the law, is often not enough to counterbalance the informational power of management (e.g. Rogers and Streeck, 1996; van het Kaar and Looise, 1999). For example, Kerkhof and Klandermans (1998) show that many works council members complain about not having access to relevant information, or having access to information in a stage of decision making that is too late to have an impact on the decisions reached. Of course, works councils are not powerless in their consultations with management. For example, the influence of works councils typically is largest in the implementation phase of a decision-making process, where the potential impact on the outcomes of a decision is smallest

(Looise and De Lange, 1987). One of the reasons behind this phenomenon, which Looise and De Lange (1987) label the “participation paradox”, is that information about upcoming decision is sent to the works council too late to still have substantial influence on the nature of the decision. Thus, we argue that the relationship between works council members and management is one that can be characterised as the relationship between a powerful (management) and a less powerful (works council members) party. These power differences stem in part from the hierarchical differences when an employee acts as an employee instead of a member of the works council, and partly from differences in access to relevant information have consequences for the way trust comes about.

Trust in management among works council members

Since the relationship between a works council and management shares many of the characteristics of the relationship between a powerful and a less powerful party, the literature on trust in management can fruitfully be applied to the works council members’ trust in their managerial counterpart. Rousseau *et al.* (1998, p. 395) define trust as:

[...] a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behaviour of another.

Vulnerability in the case of works councils may take the form of a decision not to use its full legal rights in a particular issue, in order to gain credit from management that can be used in other issues. In this example, the risk the works council runs is that neither the constituents of the works council, nor management appreciate this gesture. The question we pose in this paper is what causes a works council member to trust management, and run this kind of risk.

One particularly interesting question regarding the antecedents of trust is whether works council members trust management because of expectations regarding the outcomes of the consultations (e.g. influence on decision making, decisions that are profitable to the workforce), or because of the way these outcomes have been established (e.g. did management involve the works council in decision making, were the decision-making procedures fair). In other words, does trust arise because trust has shown to pay off in the past? Or does trust arise because one has been treated in a respectful way? Tyler and Kramer (1996) label these two groups of antecedents of trust instrumental vs relational antecedents of trust.

In instrumental models of trust, self-interest is the prime motive for the decision to trust somebody. Tyler and DeGoey (1996, p. 332) summarise this way of looking at trust as follows: “trust is seen as a subjective probability of the potential costs and benefits of future interactions”. Thus, according to this instrumental view of trust, people trust somebody when they have reason to believe that the other person will treat them in a favourable way, and that

future interaction will generate favourable outcomes. An instrumental model of trust would predict that works council members trust management more when they gets things done. In such a view, when management gives the works council influence on decision making, and works council members have the idea that the actions of the works council have a positive effect on the organisation, works council members will trust management. Trust is enhanced when the relationship is seen as profitable.

Tyler and Degoey (1996, p. 332) contrast this view of trust with a social or relational view of trust. In this view, the “intentions to maintain respectful relations in decision-making processes are central to trust”. Although outcomes can serve a heuristic function in making up one’s mind about the motives and intentions of the other person, in the relational models of trust, outcomes are not central. For example, Tyler and Lind’s (1992) group value model of authority suggests that people are concerned about their status in the group, and that the way they are treated by others provides them with information about how they are valued. Trust in authorities in this model does not depend on expected utility of future co-operation, but on the way one is treated. According to the group value model, trust is enhanced when people are treated in a respectful manner that communicates to them that they are important and valued members of the group. A relational model of trust predicts that trust is enhanced when management shows respect and values the works council and its members by giving it information on time and by dealing with works council members in a friendly and respectful way. The degree to which management values the works council is reflected in the procedures management uses in its dealing with the works council. For example, when information is given to the works council long before decisions are made, the works council has a chance to influence the decision-making process. Although there is undoubtedly a strong instrumental benefit to fair procedures (Thibaut and Walker, 1975), the group value model of Tyler and Lind (1992) states that above and beyond their direct benefits, fair procedures communicate to group members that they are considered important.

In a fascinating study, Kramer (1996) shows that one’s hierarchical or power position strongly determines the nature, origins and level of trust. First, low power persons perceive the level of trust in the relationship as lower than those in power. Second, trust matters more to those low in power than to those in high power positions: persons in a low power position consider more issues as relevant to trust and remember more trust related incidents than those high in power. Third, and most important for our reasoning, trust of the low power persons is based more on relational considerations, whereas among high power persons trust is more instrumental and task-focused. Low power typically is associated with low status. Following the reasoning of Tyler and Lind (1992), the way one is treated by a high status person is highly informative about one’s own status in the group or in the organisation. Therefore, for those low in

power, trust is often more strongly based on relational than on instrumental considerations.

In this study, we want to explore what causes works council members to trust their managerial counterpart. Kramer's work suggests that given the asymmetrical power relationship of works council members and management, trust in management among works council members is determined by relational, rather than instrumental or task-focused considerations. In other words, we think that trust in management can be explained better by a relational model than by an instrumental model of trust. We tested this prediction in a longitudinal study among the members of 75 Dutch works councils and their counterparts in management. Perceptions of works council effectiveness and influence were used as instrumental predictors of trust. Procedural justice and the quality of treatment by management were used as relational predictors of trust in management. Trust was measured half a year after the instrumental and relational predictors had been assessed.

Method

The data presented in this paper are based on two questionnaires sent to works council members in municipal organisations. The first questionnaire was sent at the end of 1998. This survey consisted of several questions, including the predictor variables. The second questionnaire was sent in March 1999 and consisted of several questions, including our dependent measure trust in management.

Sample and participants

A stratified sample of 108 works councils was selected from the total population of works councils in municipal organisations in The Netherlands. The selected councils were requested to participate and 75 (69 per cent) agreed to do so. The works councils functioned within a variety of organisations, ranging from an accountancy department in one of the major cities in The Netherlands, to a civic centre in small southern village. The size of the selected works councils varied from 3 to 16 members ($m = 8.2$, $SD = 2.62$). The size of the organisations varied between 27 and 2,800 employees ($m = 325.51$, $SD = 411.32$).

We approached 633 works council members to participate in our study, 379 members (59.9 per cent) did fill in the first questionnaire and of these 379 works council members, 315 participated in the second round (83.1 per cent). The total response for both interviews was 49.8 per cent. The mean age of the works council members was 44.7 years ($SD = 7.49$), 83.7 per cent of the respondents were male.

Dependent measures

Trust in management among works council members was assessed at $t1$ and $t2$ using seven items originating from the short version of the Organisational

Trust Inventory (OTI) (Cummings and Bromiley, 1996). The items we used were: "In my opinion, top management is reliable"; "I feel that top management negotiates with us honestly"; "I think that top management meets its negotiated obligations to our department"; "I think that the people in top management tell the truth in negotiations"; "I feel that top management will keep its word"; "I think that top management does not mislead us"; and "I feel that top management tries to get out of its commitments". The items that we selected reflect both the cognitive and the affective dimension of trust of the OTI. Moreover, items were selected to reflect both the "keeping commitments" and "negotiating honestly" dimensions of the original OTI. All responses were made on five-point scales (ranging from 1 = strongly disagree, indicating low trust, to 5 = strongly agree, indicating high trust) and were averaged to form a scale of trust in management.

Independent measures

Instrumental antecedents. Works council influence within the organisation was assessed by asking the works council members about the amount of influence of the works council on each of five domains: general management and economical policies, internal organisation, personnel policies, terms of employment and working conditions. The responses were made on five-point scales, ranging from 1 (very little influence), to 5 (very much influence).

Works council influence on management decisions was assessed using three items. The works council members were asked how often:

- (1) the suggestions of the works council are included in the decisions reached by management;
- (2) they have the feeling that the works council contributed to the decisions made by management; and
- (3) they are satisfied with the outcomes of the consultations.

The responses were made on five-point scales, ranging from 1 (never), to 5 (often).

Works council effectiveness was assessed using an existing list of eight items that measures to what degree employees feel that the works council actually generates positive effects (IDE, 1981; Andriessen *et al.*, 1984). Examples of items are: "Are the interests of employees better represented because of the work of the works council?" and "Has the work of the works council brought about an equalisation of power between employees and management?". All responses were made on four-point scales (1 = definitely, 2 = maybe, 3 = I don't think so and 4 = definitely not; we also included a category I don't really know). The responses to the eight items were averaged to form a composite measure of perceived works council effectiveness.

Relational antecedents. Procedural justice was measured with nine items, based on six criteria for procedural justice formulated by Leventhal (1980).

These criteria include consistency, bias suppression, accuracy, correctability, representativeness and ethicality. Seven items stemmed from an existing scale (Altena and Van Yperen, 1988) and two items were constructed for this study. Subjects responded to the stem: "In this organisation" with the following completions:

- ... rules and procedures are used with consistency.
- ... personal motives and biases of management often play a role in decision-making procedures
- ... decisions are influenced by matters that should not be taken into consideration
- ... management decisions are based on carefully and accurately gathered information
- ... all employees who are affected by a decision get a clear explanation after that decision has been made
- ... employees have the opportunity to express their opinions before a decision has been made
- ... the decision-making process could be criticised from a moral point of view
- ... all parties involved by a decision are represented in the decision-making process
- ... employees have the opportunity to challenge decisions.

All responses were made on five-point scales (1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree).

The quality of treatment by the CEO was assessed using four items – the CEO:

- (1) does not take us seriously;
- (2) involves us in decision making at his/her own initiative;
- (3) is open to suggestions of the works council; and
- (4) declines contributions of the works council in decision making.

Responses were made on five-point scales (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree).

The variables, their means, standard deviations and reliabilities are shown in Table I.

Results

We will present the analysis of our data in three steps. First, we will show the intercorrelations between the variables. Second, we will show the results of a linear regression analysis of trust on its relational and instrumental predictors in management at $t1$. Third, we will use trust at $t2$ as a dependent variable in a regression analysis and establish whether the predictors can explain variance when we control for the stability in trust.

Table II shows the correlations of trust and its instrumental and relational antecedents.

Trust in management at *t1* is strongly correlated with trust in management at *t2*. All predictors, both instrumental and relational, are associated positively with trust in management at *t1* and *t2*. The correlations of the instrumental antecedents range between .23 for works council effectiveness with trust in management at *t2* and .46 for works council influence on management decisions with trust in management at *t1* (both *ps* < 0.001). Thus, works council members who think that the council is influential or effective report more trust in management than their colleagues who do not think that the works council is influential or effective.

The relational antecedents correlate more strongly with trust in management: the correlations with trust in management are all in between 0.46 and 0.65 (all *ps* < 0.001). Works council members who think that decision-making procedures are fair and that they are treated in a respectful manner, report higher trust in management at both *t1* and *t2*.

The relational and instrumental variables are strongly related to each other. For example, procedural justice correlates 0.42 (*p* < 0.001) with works council

	m	SD	<i>n</i>	Cronbach's alpha
1. Trust in management (<i>t1</i>)	3.3	0.75	317	0.92
2. Trust in management (<i>t2</i>)	3.3	0.69	314	0.79
3. Works council influence in the organisation	2.9	0.71	311	0.77
4. Works council influence on management decisions	3.5	0.60	314	0.78
5. Works council effectiveness	3.0	0.41	312	0.78
6. Procedural justice	2.7	0.54	313	0.84
7. Quality of treatment	3.6	0.64	314	0.80
8. Trust in works council	4.3	0.53	51	0.88

Table I.
Means, standard deviations and Cronbach's alphas of the scales

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Trust in management (<i>t1</i>)	–						
2. Trust in management (<i>t2</i>)	0.66	–					
<i>Instrumental antecedents</i>							
3. Works council influence in the organisation	0.33	0.26	–				
4. Works council influence on management decisions	0.46	0.31	0.47	–			
5. Works council effectiveness	0.38	0.23	0.50	0.46	–		
<i>Relational antecedents</i>							
6. Procedural justice	0.62	0.48	0.36	0.42	0.35	–	
7. Quality of treatment	0.65	0.46	0.40	0.56	0.44	0.50	–

Table II.
Intercorrelations of the variables (309 < *n* < 314)

Note: All correlations are significant at the 0.001 level (two-tailed)

influence on management decisions and the quality of treatment by management correlates 0.56 ($p < 0.001$) with works council influence on management decision making. Thus, favourable outcomes are related to fair procedures and to high quality treatment by management.

Given the high intercorrelations between our predictors, we conducted a regression analysis to determine which of our predictors shares the highest unique variance with trust in management. First, we tried to establish which variables perform best in explaining variance in trust in management at *t1*. Table III shows the result of a regression analysis in which we first entered the instrumental antecedents (Model 1) and then added the relational antecedents (Model 2).

In Model 1, the instrumental antecedents explain 25 per cent of the variance in trust in management (*t1*). The strongest predictor is works council influence on management decisions ($\beta = 0.33, p < 0.001$): works council members that perceive the works council to be influential in their consultations with management, report higher trust in management than their colleagues who perceive the works council as having less influence on management decision-making. Effectiveness of the works council is also positively related to trust in management ($\beta = 0.18, p < 0.01$). The works council influence in the organisation as a whole is not related to trust in management.

However, after entering the relational antecedents in Model 2, none of the β s of the instrumental variables reaches significance, whereas both the relational antecedents, procedural justice and quality of treatment, show positive and significant associations with trust in management (respectively $\beta = 0.38$ and $\beta = 0.42$, both $ps < 0.001$). Works council members are more likely to trust management when they perceive decision-making procedures as fair and when

Table III.
Regression analysis
of trust in
management (*t1*) on
predictors (*t1*)

	Model 1 β	Model 2 β
<i>Instrumental antecedents</i>		
Works council influence in the organisation	0.09	-0.01
Works council influence on management decisions	0.33**	0.05
Effectiveness of works council	0.18*	0.05
<i>Relational antecedents</i>		
Procedural justice		0.38**
Quality of treatment		0.42**
Total R^2 (adj.)	0.25	0.54
<i>F</i>	33.21**	70.25**
<i>df</i>	3,304	5,302

Notes: * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.001$

they feel they are treated in a respectful manner by management. Together, the instrumental and relational antecedents explain 54 per cent of the variance in trust in management.

Table IV shows the results of a regression of trust in management at *t2* on the instrumental (Model 1) and relational antecedents (Model 2) at *t1*. In Model 3 we control for the stability in trust by entering trust in management at *t1*.

Models 1 and 2 show a pattern that is similar to that in Table III: the instrumental antecedents are only significantly related to trust in management at *t2* as long as the relational antecedents are not entered in the equation. In Model 2, 29 per cent of the variance in trust in management is explained by the instrumental and relational antecedents. Again, only the relational antecedents show the expected positive relationship with trust in management at *t2*. Both procedural justice and quality of treatment show positive and significant associations with trust in management at *t2* (respectively $\beta = 0.33$ and $\beta = 0.29$, both $ps < 0.001$). Works council members are more likely to trust management when they perceive decision-making procedures as fair and when they feel they are treated in a respectful manner by management.

In Model 3, trust in management at *t1* is entered in the equation. We are able to explain 43 per cent of trust in management at *t2* using only *t1* predictors. Trust in management at *t2* is strongly related to trust in management at *t1* ($\beta = 0.57$, $p < 0.001$). Apart from procedural justice, none of the other antecedents is a significant predictor of trust in management at *t2*. Procedural justice, however, still has a weak positive effect on trust in management at *t2*, even when we control for the stability in trust ($\beta = 0.12$, $p < 0.05$).

	Model 1 β	Model 2 β	Model 3 β
<i>Instrumental antecedents</i>			
Works council influence in the organisation	0.14*	0.06	0.07
Works council influence on management decisions	0.22**	0.00	-0.02
Effectiveness of works council	0.06	-0.05	-0.07
<i>Relational antecedents</i>			
Procedural justice		0.33**	0.12*
Quality of treatment		0.29**	0.05
Trust in management (<i>t1</i>)			0.57**
Total R^2 (adj.)	0.11	0.29	0.43
<i>F</i>	13.51***	25.47**	40.20**
<i>df</i>	3,304	5	6,301

Notes: * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

Table IV. Regression analysis of trust in management (*t2*) on predictors (*t1*)

Thus, overall relational antecedents are far better predictors of trust in management than instrumental antecedents. Over time, the only predictor of trust in management is procedural justice.

Discussion

In this paper we explored the antecedents of trust in management among works council members. Specifically, we tested whether works council members' trust in management is associated more strongly with relational than with instrumental determinants. Our results lend support to a view on trust in management among works council members that is relational rather than instrumental in nature. In the words of Tyler and DeGoey (1996, p. 345): "trust is a social commodity". Trust is a reaction to social information, information about the quality of our relationship with members of the organisation, rather than to information about the favourability of the outcomes of a relationship. Indeed, the instrumental considerations in our study (e.g. works council influence) were only associated with trust because of their associations with relational considerations (e.g. quality of treatment). Thus, although favourable outcomes often go hand in hand with respectful treatment or fair procedures, it is the latter that causes trust among members of works councils.

Works council members' judgement about the quality of the relationship with management appears to be derived from both respectful treatment and fair procedures. The quality of treatment as we used it in our study is somewhat similar to what some authors call interactional fairness (e.g. Bies and Moag, 1986), and refers to the quality of interpersonal treatment while procedures are being implemented. The fact that the quality of treatment exerts an effect on trust is the strongest evidence in our study for a relational view on trust. Whereas the effects of procedural justice may be ascribed to the control and, thus, the instrumental benefits of fair procedures (Thibaut and Walker, 1975), it is hard to come up with purely instrumental and non-social benefits of a respectful treatment.

Even though fair procedures are partly instrumental for people, the effects of procedural justice in our study do in our view lend support to a relational conceptualisation of trust. Procedural justice was associated with trust even when the instrumental benefits (e.g. works council influence) were held constant. Therefore, the effects cannot be explained by its instrumental correlates.

Our study has some limitations that the readers should take into account when drawing conclusions. First, although our study is longitudinal, one should be cautious with drawing strong causal conclusions. Although it is likely that procedural justice and the quality of treatment cause trust instead of vice versa, it could be the case that initial trust causes works council members to behave in a more co-operative way. This may cause the CEO to become

friendlier and to use fair procedures. This reverses the causal chain we assumed in our study.

Second, our measures of the instrumental antecedents may not be as strong as our measures of the relational antecedents. Although the reliabilities seem to be fairly good for both the instrumental and the relational variables, within works councils there is much more agreement about the relational than about the instrumental antecedents. For example, there are not many different opinions within one works council about the quality of treatment by the CEO, but there are many different opinions about the amount of influence of the works council or the effects. This may cause the effects of these variables to be less reliable than the effects of the relational variables.

Third, our measure of trust may have been disadvantageous for the instrumental antecedents. Items like "I feel that top management will keep its word" may have a more relational than instrumental flavour: they refer to the process of negotiation rather than to its outcomes. Further research should pay careful attention to the way trust is operationalised.

It is intriguing to think about the practical implications of our study for building trust among works council members. One could conclude from our study that CEOs can gain trust from works council members without giving the works council any real influence on management decision making. In theory, this is possible. In practice, however, this would be hard to do without violating principles of fair procedures. This in the end leads to less trust. On the other hand, our results do indicate that always giving in to the wishes of the work council is not necessary when one wants to be trusted. There clearly is more to be gained when it comes to trust from fair procedures and respectful treatment than from continuously giving in to the demands of the works council. Only when giving in is combined with fair procedures (e.g. an open debate), will it lead to a climate of trust.

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Determinants of
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